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〔美〕詹密罗(Robert M.Gimello)



作者简介:詹密罗(Robert M.Gimello),诺特丹大学教授。

One of the Qǐxìn lùn \'s several distinctive claims,inspired especially by the Bodhiruci(菩提流支)translation of the Lakāvatāra Sūtra (T 670:《入楞伽经》),is that the ālayavijñāna,the foundational consciousness of the ordinary,unawakened sentient being,consisting in a stream of“arising”(prav东亚佛学评论(第4辑)pdf/doc/txt格式电子书下载tti,生)and“ceasing”(niv东亚佛学评论(第4辑)pdf/doc/txt格式电子书下载tti,灭)of momentary thought-impulses(念),is based upon the tathāgatagarbha,the inherent buddhahood of the sentient being understood as an inviolate,radiant,intrinsic purity of mind.And on the basis of this claim the Qǐxìn lùnadvances the further claim that,precisely because it is based on the tathāgatagarbha,the ālayavijñānamust be understood to be a paradoxical“coincidence of opposites”—specifically,the concurrence or coinherence of awakening and ignorance.As the text says:

As regards the mind\'s arising and ceasing,1it is on the basis of the tathāgatagarbha that there is an arising and ceasing mind,which is to say that(the mind\'s)non-arising and non-ceasing is united with its arising and ceasing in such a way that they are neither one and the same nor different.Called the ālayavijñāna,this is consciousness in two senses such as can both encompass and produce all dharmas.What are these two(senses of the ālayavijñāna)? The first is(the ālayavijñāna)in the sense of(the mind)awake;the second is(the ālayavijñāna)in the sense of(the mind)unawake.

心生灭者。依如来藏故,有生灭心。所谓不生不灭与生灭和合非一非异。名为阿梨耶识,此识有二种义,能摄一切法生一切法。云何为二?一者觉义。二者不觉义。(T 1666:32.576b7-11)

As we shall see,Fǎzàng\'s interpretation of this claim amounts to what one might call a“dyophysite”view of the“arising and ceasing mind”(生灭心),i.e.,the ālayavijñāna.This foundational mind,he tells us,is actually a single mind but a single mind possessed of two distinct natures,identities,or essential qualities(二相).These two essential qualities of the ālaya,although functionally distinct,are said to be nevertheless one and the same.Indeed,they are said to be one and the same in a particular and especially strong sense.It is not simply that the mind is a mere mixture or coincidence of“awake”(觉)and“unawake”(不觉)consciousness.The mind awake and the mind unawake are not simply two parts or phases of the mind\'s operation.Rather,foundational consciousness as the condition of being awake and foundational consciousness as the condition of not being awake are said actually to form,comprise,or constitute each other.They are,Fǎzàng says,“mutually constitutive”(相成).If one may use a modern metaphor admittedly unknown to the Buddhist tradition one might speak of the arising and ceasing mind as a kind of“Möbius strip(莫比乌斯环)mind”,in which the awake and the unawake natures of the mind constitute each other in much the same way that what might appear to be the two“surfaces”of a Möbius strip are found actually to form a single continuous surface.More will be said about this metaphor below.

Fǎzàng,of course,was quite aware that this teaching of the Qǐxìn lùn (and the Lakāvatāra)was anomalous.In this regard it is like other anomalous teachings of the treatise such as the teaching that suchness(tathatā,真如),which is synonymous with the unconditioned(asaṃsk东亚佛学评论(第4辑)pdf/doc/txt格式电子书下载ta,无为),is nevertheless subject to permeation(vasanā,熏习)by the thoroughly conditioned(saṃsk东亚佛学评论(第4辑)pdf/doc/txt格式电子书下载ta,有为)phenomenon of ignorance.The questions such teachings raise are unavoidable.Is not permeation itself a kind of conditioning? If it is,and if suchness is permeated by ignorance,can it be said to be truly unconditioned? And if permeation is not a kind of conditioning then what is it? In particular Fǎzàng was aware that the Qǐxìn lùn \'s concept of the ālayavijñānawas variously at odds with the reputedly“orthodox”traditions of Yogācāra in which the category of a foundational consciousness was originally conceived and formulated.We should therefore approach these doctrinal anomalies of the Qǐxìn lùnin the way in which Fǎzàng himself did,i.e.,by dealing explicitly with the question of the relationship of the Qǐxìn lùnto the other doctrines and scriptural authorities of the Mahāyāna tradition.Initial attention will therefore be given in this paper to the doxographical context of Fǎzàng\'s interpretation,i.e.,his views on the subject of where among the varieties of Mahāyāna scripture and doctrine the Qǐxìn lùn properly belongs.This will lead finally to a consideration of one of Fǎzàng\'s most surprising interpretative moves,namely,his intriguing but largely overlooked use of the concept of self-awareness(svasaṃvitti/svasaṃvedana)to explain how it is that foundational consciousness,the arising and ceasing mind,can be said to be both awake and not awake.

We begin,then,with an analysis of Fǎzàng\'s doxographical approach to the text,i.e.,his answer to the question of where,among the varieties of Buddhism,the Qǐxìn lùn properly belongs.We will then proceed to discuss aspects of his reading of the particular section of the Qǐxìn lùn that discusses the theme of the foundational or“arising and ceasing”mind as the coinherence of the mind\'s awake and not-awake natures.